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Abstract. On the basis of a formula for calculating seat shares and natural thresholds in multidistrict
elections under the Jefferson-D’Hondt system and a probabilistic model of electoral behavior based on
Po´lya’s urn model, we propose a new model of the relationship between the district magnitude and the
number / effective number of relevant parties. We test that model on both electoral results from multiple
countries employing the D’Hondt method (relatively small number of elections, but wide diversity of
political configurations) and data based on hundreds of Polish local elections (large number of elections,
but much higher degree of parameter uniformity). We also explore some applications of the proposed
model, demonstrating how it can be used to estimate the potential effects of electoral engineering.
1. Introduction
The study of the relationship between the number of relevant (i.e. seat-winning) parties and the
district magnitude dates back at least to the 1950’s and the celebrated Duverger’s law (Duverger, 1951,
1954) claiming that two-party systems tend to be correlated with the use of electoral plurality rule
(FPTP). Subsequent work by Rae (1967), Taagepera & Laakso (1980), Taagepera & Shugart (1989),
Lijphart (1990), and Cox (1997) have led to a generalization of Duverger’s law stating that the number
of relevant parties is correlated with the district magnitude, or, more precisely, that it is an increasing
and concave function thereof. Its classic formulation is the well-known micromega rule (Colomer, 2004).
The relationship thus revealed is due to a combination of three effects (Taagepera, 2007, 103-104): the
mechanical effect, arising from the operation of the seat apportionment formula, and the psychological
effects both on parties and voters. Parties, seeking to maximize their chance of being relevant, adjust
to small district magnitudes by the process of integration, leading to a smaller number of contending
parties, while voters, afraid of wasting their votes, vote strategically for larger parties, thus affecting the
distribution of vote shares.
There is wealth of recent empirical evidence supporting the above findings. See, e.g., Ziegfeld (2013),
Barcelo´ & Muraoka (2018), Singer & Gershman (2018). There are, however, relatively few formal (as
opposed to purely statistical) models of the relationship between the number of relevant parties and the
district magnitude. Of those, the most prominent is the Seat-Product Model, introduced by Taagepera
& Shugart (1993), and further developed by Taagepera (2007), Li & Shugart (2016), and Shugart &
Taagepera (2017). It can be expressed as follows:
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Conjecture 1 (Seat-Product Model). The number of relevant parties n can be approximated by
n ≈ nSPM := (ms)1/4 , (1)
where m is the mean district magnitude and s is the assembly size (i.e., the total number of seats).
Taagepera’s and Shugart’s reasoning is essentially as follows: first, the distribution of the number
of relevant parties in a single district of magnitude md is approximated by an absolutely continuous
distribution with support bounded by the two logical extremes, i.e., nd = 1 and nd = md. Then it
is noted that said distribution is right-skewed. From this fact it is assumed, by a reasoning loosely
analogous to the well-known principle of insufficient reason, that the expectation of that distribution
should be equal to the geometric mean of those two bounds, i.e., m
1/2
d . It is then noted that distribution
of the number of relevant parties nationwide can likewise be approximated by an absolutely continuous
distribution with support again bounded by the two logical extremes, i.e., n = md (since parties relevant
in a single districts are always nationally relevant) and n = s1/2. Again by assuming that the expectation
should be equal to the geometric mean of the two, we arrive at n = (ms)
1/4
, as above.
While certainly attractive in its simplicity, the Seat-Product Model has a number of weaknesses. Being
only a function of the assembly size and the district magnitude, and thereby failing to account for such
parameters as the apportionment formula, electoral thresholds, or sociopolitical cleavages, its empirical
accuracy is necessarily limited. At the same time, the theoretical justification for the Seat-Product Model
is highly informal. It would appear that its authors’ intended to provide a formula for expected number
of relevant parties, but if that is the case, the underlying probabilistic assumptions are not expressly
specified.
We propose an alternative model of the expected number of relevant parties in electoral systems
employing the Jefferson-D’Hondt formula for intra-district seat apportionment (we note, however, that
our model can be extended to other PR formulae, although formulation and testing of such extensions
is beyond the scope of this article). It is based on the “pot and ladle” model of the Jefferson-D’Hondt
method, formulated by three of us Flis et al. (2019) in a recent article, and on a result by two of us
(Boratyn and Stolicki) regarding the distribution of the vote shares of the k-th largest party if the
election result is drawn from the unit simplex with a uniform distribution. The two main advantages of
our formula over the Seat-Product Model lie in its improved accuracy (as demonstrated by the empirical
tests below) and its more formal theoretical justification. At the same time, it is more limited in scope:
it only applies to electoral systems employing the Jefferson-D’Hondt formula (although that limitation
becomes less restrictive as one realizes that FPTP is just a limiting case of Jefferson-D’Hondt), involves
an additional parameter in the form of the number of registered parties, is limited to the mechanical
effects, and assumes that the psychological effect on voters is negligible (as otherwise the assumption of
uniform distribution of electoral results would be less defensible).
Remark 2. Note that we do not address the question of the psychological effect on parties. Ideally, if
such effect were to be assumed, it should be modeled before the mechanical effects in order to estimate the
number of registered parties, which appears as a parameter in our formula. Here, we only note that our
empirical data is inconclusive with regard to the existence of the psychological effect: Nadaraya-Watson
kernel regression, employed due to the fact that we have no theoretical model for the functional form of
the suspected relationship between mean district magnitude and the number of relevant parties, reveals
no regular relationship between the two for Polish county elections dataset, and is wholly inconclusive for
the European national elections dataset because of the limited number of points.
We begin with setting up the notation to be used throughout the remainder of this article.
Notation 3. Let:
• x↓i denote the i-th largest element of a totally ordered countable set {x1, x2, . . .},
• s ∈ N+ be the assembly size, i.e., total number of seats,
• c ∈ N+ be the number of districts,
• N ∈ N+ be the number of registered parties,
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Figure 1. Kernel regression estimate (with 95 between the mean district magnitude
and the number of registered parties in Polish county elections.
• n ∈ {1, . . . , N} be the number of relevant parties,
• m := s/c be the mean district magnitude,
• ∆n be the (n− 1)-dimensional probability simplex,
• v := (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ ∆n be the nationwide vote share vector,
• pi := vi/
∑n
j=1 v
↓
j be the nationwide vote share of the i-th relevant party, i = 1, . . . , n, renor-
malized after excluding non-relevant parties,
• q↓i := v↓i /
∑i
j=1 v
↓
j be the nationwide vote share of the i-th largest party, i = 1, . . . , N , renor-
malized after excluding all smaller parties,
• vki be the vote share of the i-th party in the k-th district, k = 1, . . . , c,
• pki be the vote share of the i-th relevant party in the k-th district renormalized after excluding
non-relevant parties,
• Mk ∈ R+ be the Jefferson-D’Hondt multiplier in the k-th district,
• Rki :=
{
pkiMk
}
be the rounding residual of the i-th relevant party in the k-th district,
• τ ∈ (0, 1) be the statutory threshold,
• 〈xki 〉 denote the average of xki over k = 1, . . . , c.
2. Theoretical Model
2.1. The “Pot and Ladle” Model of the Jefferson-D’Hondt System. The starting point of our
reasoning consists of the “pot and ladle” model of the Jefferson-D’Hondt system, introduced in (Flis
et al., 2019) and further elaborated (Flis et al., 2018), which provides the following closed-form formula
for estimating seat counts from nationwide vote shares:
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Theorem 4. Assume there are n relevant parties. If
(A1) there exists a selection of multipliers M1, . . . ,Mk such that for each j = 1, . . . , n
(A1a) rounding residuals average to 1/2 over districts, i.e.,
〈
Rkj (Mk)
〉
= 12 ;
(A1b) multipliers are not correlated with normalized vote shares, i.e.,
Cov
(
pkj ,Mk
)
= 0;
(A2) no seats have been obtained by non-relevant parties;
(A3) for each j = 1, . . . , n the normalized nationwide vote share equals average normalized district-level
vote share, i.e., pj =
〈
pkj
〉
,
then for each relevant party, j = 1, . . . , n, the nationwide number of seats is given by
sj = pjs+ pj
cn
2
− c
2
. (2)
For proof of the above, see (Flis et al., 2018). Of the above assumptions, A2 and A3 are essentially
political in nature, requiring that there be no anomalies in the spatial distribution of party support
(such as regionalisms, malapportionment, or large differences in district magnitudes) that cause district-
level electoral results to diverge from nationwide data. In constrast, A1 is rather technical, but can be
justified mathematically: under some general distributional assumptions1, it can be shown that there
exist multipliers for which both A1a and A1b hold approximately, and thus the expected number of seats
E (sj) is well approximated by (2). Empirical research shows that both sets of assumptions correspond
closely to reality, making the “pot-and-ladle” model quite accurate.
One of the advantages of the “pot and ladle” model from our point of view consists of the fact that
it includes a mathematically convenient criterion of relevance:
Corollary 5. Assuming there are no statutory thresholds, the j-th party is relevant in the sense of
Theorem 4 if and only if
pj ≥ t := 1
2m+ n
. (3)
In the above formula, t denotes the natural threshold2. The underlying reasoning is quite simple: for
pj < t, assumptions A1 and A3 lead to a contradiction. But an apparent circularity in reasoning can
be noted: the natural threshold t depends on the number of relevant parties, which in turn depends on
n. This circularity can be eliminated when one recognizes that the above Corollary is equivalent to:
Corollary 6. Assuming there are no statutory thresholds, the k-th largest party is relevant in the sense
of Theorem 4 if and only if
p↓k ≥ tk :=
1
2m+ k
. (4)
In systems employing statutory thresholds as well, there is of course a concurrent criterion that
v↓k ≥ τ . (5)
It further follows that:
1District magnitudes S1, . . . , Sc are independent random variables identically distributed according to some discrete
probability distribution on N+ with expectation m ∈ [Smin,∞), where Smin ≥ 1; district-level vote share vectors P1, . . . ,Pc
are independent random variables identically distributed according to some absolutely continuous probability distribution
on the (n− 1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆n with expectation p := (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n and some continously differentiable
density vanishing at the faces of ∆n and non-increasing within radius (Smin + 1)
−1 from the vertices of ∆n.
2The concept of the natural threshold of inclusion, i.e., the minimal vote share necessary to obtain a non-zero number of
seats, has been first introduced by Rokkan (1968). Rae et al. (1971) have later introduced a complementary concept of the
threshold of exclusion, i.e., maximum vote share under which a party can fail to obtain a non-zero number of seats. Natural
thresholds for diverse methods of seat apportionment have been obtained in the following years by, inter alia, Loosemore
& Hanby (1971), Lijphart & Gibberd (1977), Laakso (1979), and Palomares & Ramı´rez Gonza´lez (2003). Unfortunately,
those theoretical results are applicable only within a single electoral district. Nationwide thresholds cannot be estimated
precisely without additional assumptions regarding the distribution of party support over districts, although several widely
applicable heuristics have been proposed by Taagepera (1989, 1998b,a, 2002).
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Corollary 7. The number of relevant parties appearing in (2) is given by
n := max
{
k = 1, . . . , N : p↓k ≥
1
2m+ k
and v↓k ≥ τ
}
. (6)
2.2. Modeling the Distribution of Party Vote Shares. What is the probability that the k-th
largest party is relevant under Eq. (4) and under Eq. (5)? It is clear that the answer depends on the
distribution of votes among parties (note that unlike in the preceding chapter, the random variable
here is the nationwide rather than district-level vector of vote shares). The problem of modeling such
distribution is equivalent to a special case of the problem of modeling preference orderings, which is well
known in the social choice theory (see, e.g., Regenwetter et al., 2006 and Tideman & Plassmann, 2012).
Of those, motivated by the principle of insufficient reason, we choose the Impartial Anonymous Culture
(IAC) model which treats each preference profile (and, thus, each distribution of votes among parties) as
equiprobable Gehrlein & Fishburn, 1976; Kuga & Nagatani, 19743. Accordingly, the vote share vector v
follows the uniform distribution on a discrete grid of points within ∆N , which, as the number of voters
approaches infinity, weakly converges to the uniform distribution on ∆N . To simplify calculations, we
focus on the limiting case.
Under those distributional assumptions, we arrive at two results regarding the distribution of absolute
and normalized vote shares of the k-th largest party:
Theorem 8. If V ∼Unif (∆N ), where Unif (∆N ) is the uniform distribution on ∆N , then V ↓k , k =
1, . . . , N , is distributed according to a continuous distribution supported on [0, 1/k] for k > 1 and on
[1/N, 1] for k = 1, with density fV ↓k
given by:
fV ↓k
(x) := N (N − 1)
(
N − 1
k − 1
)min(N,b1/xc)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
(1− ax)N−2 . (7)
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Figure 2. Density of the distribution of the voting weight of the k-th largest of 4 players.
Theorem 9. If V ∼Unif (∆N ), where Unif (∆N ) is the uniform distribution on ∆N , then P ↓1 = 1 with
probability 1, and P ↓k , k = 2, . . . , N , is distributed according to a continuous distribution supported on
3The assumption of uniform distribution of party vote shares, which underlies the IAC model, has been made by a
number of authors working on mathematical voting theory, including Happacher 2001; Schuster et al. 2003; Schwingenschlo¨gl
& Drton 2004; Janson & Linusson 2011; and others.
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[0, 1/k], with density fP↓k
given by:
fP↓k
(x) := 1{z<1/k} k (k − 1)
(
N
k
)
(1− xk)k−2×
×
N∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
(1 + (a− k)x)−k . (8)
For proofs of the above theorems, see Appendix A.
Note that Theorem 8 corresponds to a known earlier result on the order statistics of uniform spacings
(Darling, 1953; Rao & Sobel, 1980; Devroye, 1981). However, it is impossible to obtain Theorem 9
from that result alone, and proof techniques employed in the context of uniform spacings are not easily
extended to that question. In contrast, our (original) proof of Theorem 8, given in the Appendix A,
provides a foundation of the proof of Theorem 9 as well.
2.3. Probability of Relevance. From Theorems 9 and 9 we can obtain a closed-form formula for the
probability of the k-th largest party being relevant. Recall from (4) that in the absence of a statutory
threshold, the k-th largest party is relevant if and only if
p↓k ≥ tk := (2m+ k)−1 . (9)
Thus, we are interested in Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
. By integrating the density of P ↓k , we obtain (see Appendix B
for details):
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
= k
(
N
k
) N∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
1
a
(
2m
a+ 2m
)k−1
. (10)
Likewise, the k-th largest party is relevant under a statutory threshold if v↓k ≥ τ .By integrating the
density of V ↓k , we obtain:
Pr
(
V ↓k > τ
)
= N
(
N − 1
k − 1
)min(N,bτ−1c)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
1
a
(1− aτ)N−1 . (11)
2.4. Expected Number of Relevant Parties. Expected number of relevant parties is easy to obtain
from the above results. First, let us note that the probability that the k-th party is last relevant party
can be expressed as the difference of the probabilities of relevance of the k-th and (k + 1)-th parties (with
Pr
(
P ↓N+1 > tN+1
)
= Pr
(
V ↓N+1 > τ
)
= 0):
Pr (n = k) = Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
− Pr
(
P ↓k+1 > tk+1
)
. (12)
Now from the formula for the expectation of a discrete distribution we have (see Appendix C for details):
En =
N∑
k=1
kPr (n = k) =
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
, (13)
and if statutory thresholds are accounted for,
En = min
{
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
,
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
V ↓k > τ
)}
. (14)
We can likewise obtain the formula for the second moment of n,
E
(
n2
)
=
N∑
k=1
k2 Pr (n = k) = 2
N∑
k=2
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
, (15)
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and thus for variance,
Var (n) = E
(
n2
)− (En)2 =
= 2
N∑
k=2
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
(
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
))2
. (16)
2.5. Plots. The behavior of formulae (10) and (13) is illustrated by the following plots.
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Figure 3. Probability of relevance of the k-th party, k = 1, . . . , N , out of N = 12 (left)
or N = 20 (right) assuming mean district magnitude m = 8.
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Figure 4. Probability of relevance of the 4-th party out of N = 4, . . . , 20, assuming
mean district magnitude m = 8.
8 D. BORATYN, J. FLIS, W. S LOMCZYN´SKI, AND D. STOLICKI
5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
m
P
r
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Figure 5. Probability of relevance of the k-th party out of N = 12 as a function of
mean district magnitude m.
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Figure 6. Expected number of relevant parties as a function of mean district magnitude
m and the number of registered parties N = 2, . . . , 12.
3. Empirical Test
We have tested our model using two sets of data: general elections results from nine EU countries
using the Jefferson–D’Hondt method (with Belgium split into the Flemish and Waloon regions due to the
disjointness of their party systems) and Polish county council elections. The European general election
dataset is rather small (87 elections), but highly heterogenous in terms of both parameters of interest
(i.e., the district magnitude varies between 6.731 and 150, and the number of registered parties varies
between 3 and 28). The Polish county election dataset is more numerous (1564 elections), but more
homogenous (m varies between 3 and 9.5, and N – between 2 and 15).
3.1. General Elections in Nine EU Countries Using Jefferson-D’Hondt. There are currently
nine EU member states using the Jefferson–D’Hondt method for parliamentary seat allocation in mul-
timember districts (we exclude countries such as Austria that only use JDH in combination with other
methods, e.g., in multi-tiered elections): Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg,
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Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. For each of those nine countries, we analyze all post-1945
elections held under JDH rule (as noted above, we treat the Belgian general election of 2014, the only
one held under pure JDH, as a special case, i.e., as two concurrent but distinct elections in Flemish
and Walloon regions). For each election, we have identified the mean district magnitude m and the
number of registered national parties (defining a registered national party as a party or a single-list
coalition fielding candidates in at least 90% of electoral districts), computed the expected number of
relevant parties using our probabilistic model, and compared the outcome with the one arising under the
Seat-Product Model. Table 1 gives mean L1 errors (absolute deviations from the mean) for our model,
the Seat-Product Model, and “naive” n = N model.
country probabilistic SPM n = N
Belgium – F 0.128 0.039 0.333
Belgium – W 0.051 0.276 0.428
Croatia 0.226 0.238 1.988
Czech Republic 0.368 0.397 2.002
Finland 0.125 0.235 0.530
Luxembourg 0.112 0.163 0.146
Netherlands 0.750 0.240 1.014
Poland 0.083 0.433 0.792
Portugal 0.433 0.495 1.096
Spain 0.328 0.378 0.848
Table 1. Normalized Mean Absolute Deviation 〈|En− n|/n〉.
As can be seen from the above results, the probabilistic model of the number of relevant parties
is an improvement over earlier models like the Seat–Product Model, scoring better for eight of ten
tested countries, and worse only for Wallonia (where the whole sample consists of a single election)
and Netherlands (where the ease of registering small parties makes the uniform distribution assumption
probably unrealistic).
3.2. Polish County Elections. There are currently 314 counties in Poland. In each county, there
is a council (varying between 15 and 60 seats) elected using the Jefferson-D’Hondt with the statutory
threshold of 5%. Each county is divided into three or more districts with magnitude greater than or
equal to 3. For each county, we analyze all elections between 1998 and 2014 (yielding 1564 elections),
again computing the expected number of relevant parties using our probabilistic model and comparing
the outcome with the one arising under the Seat-Product Model. Mean error values are given in Table
2.
mean abs. dev. mean square error
model 〈|En− n|〉
√〈
(En− n)2
〉
probabilistic 0.945 1.149
Seat-Product Model 2.068 2.460
n = N 2.111 2.466
Table 2. Overall Errors of the Three Alternative Models of the Number of Relevant Parties.
Again, the probabilistic model represents a significant improvement over the alternatives.
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Figure 7. Kernel density estimates of the normalized absolute deviation |En − n|/n
for the probabilistic model (black curve), the Seat-Product Model (blue curve) and the
“naive” (n = N) model (red curve).
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Appendix A. Distribution of P ↓k and V
↓
k
Let X1, . . . , XN be independent random variables distributed according to Exp (1), i.e., with density
f (x) := e−x. It is well known (see, e.g, Jambunathan, 1954) that(
X1∑N
i=1Xi
, . . . ,
XN∑N
i=1Xi
)
∼ Unif (∆N ) . (17)
A.1. k-th order statistic X↓k . Consider first the density of X
↓
k . We start with the following result by
Re´nyi (1953):
X↓k
d
=
N∑
j=k
Zj
j
, (18)
where Zj , . . . , ZN ∼ Exp (1) and are i.i.d. Thus,
ϕX↓k
(s) =
N∏
j=k
(
1− is
j
)−1
=
N∏
j=k
j
j − is =
(k)N−k+1
(k − is)N−k+1
, (19)
wherefore (by Le´vy’s inversion formula, Billingsley, 1995, p. 347, (26.20))
fX↓k
(x) =
(k)N−k+1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−isx
(k − is)N−k+1
ds. (20)
Let us denote the function under the integral as λ (s). Note that it has N − k + 1 simple poles at
−ik, . . . ,−iN .
Let us consider a contour Cr := [r,−r] ∪Ar, where
Ar := {x ∈ C : (|x| = r) and arg(x) ∈ (pi, 2pi)} (21)
is a positively oriented arc from −r to r centered at 0, and r > N . Then by the residue theorem,∮
Cr
λ (s) ds = 2pii
∑N
j=k
Res (λ,−ij) . (22)
Let us first consider the integral of λ (s) over Ar. Let us substitute s = re
iθ, where θ ∈ (pi, 2pi). Then
for s ∈ Ar we have
|λ (s)| ≤ erx sin θ
N∏
j=k
∣∣∣(j + r sin θ − ir cos θ)−1∣∣∣ = (23)
= erx sin θ
N∏
j=k
(
j2 + r2 + 2jr sin θ
)−1
, (24)
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which is dominated by erx sin θr−2(N−k+1) as r →∞. Therefore by the estimation lemma (Howie, 2003,
Theorem 5.24), ∮
Ar
λ (s) ds = O
(
erx sin θr−2(N−k+1)r
)
= O (0) (25)
as r →∞, wherefore ∫ +∞
−∞
λ (s) ds = −2pii
∑N
j=k
Res (λ,−ij) (26)
(the minus sign in the integral arises because the contour integral is computed in the reverse direction).
Computing the residues, we get
Res (λ,−ij) = lim
s→−ij
(s+ ij) e−isx
∏N
l=k
1
l − is = (27)
= ie−jx
∏j−1
l=k
1
l − j
∏N
l=j+1
1
l − j = (28)
= i (−1)k−j 1
(j − k)!
1
(N − j)!e
−jx, (29)
and thus ∫ +∞
−∞
λ (s) ds = −2pii
∑N
j=k
i (−1)k−j 1
(j − k)!
1
(N − j)!e
−jx = (30)
= 2pi
e−kx (1− e−x)N−k
(N − k)! . (31)
Substituting the above into (19), we obtain the density of X↓k :
fX↓k
(x) =
N !
(k − 1)!
e−kx (1− e−x)N−k
(N − k)! = k
(
N
k
)
e−kx
(
1− e−x)N−k . (32)
A.2. Vote shares. Let us fix the k-th largest order statistic, X↓k , at y, and let:
• Ψ↓ := ∑Nj=k+1X↓j ,
• Ψ↑ := ∑k−1j=1 X↓j ,
• Ψ := ∑Nj=1X↓j = Ψ↓ + Ψ↑ +X↓k .
The non-normalized vote share of the k-th party is given by
V ↓k =
X↓k
Ψ
. (33)
The normalized vote share of the k-th party assuming k relevant parties is given by
P ↓k =
V ↓k∑k
j=1 V
↓
j
=
V ↓k
Ψ
Ψ∑k
j=1 V
↓
k
=
V ↓k
V ↓k + Ψ↑
. (34)
Note that Ψ↑ =
∑k−1
j=1 Yj , where Yj ∼ Exp (1) truncated to (y,∞), and Ψ↓ =
∑N−k
j=1 Zj , where
Zj ∼ Exp (1) truncated to (0, y). Then the density of Zj is given by
fZ(x) =
e−x
F (y)− F (0) =
e−x
1− e−y (35)
for x ∈ (0, y), and the density of Yj is given by
fY (x) =
e−x
1− F (y) = e
y−x (36)
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for x ∈ (y,∞), and their characteristic functions are given by, respectively,
ϕZ (t) =
1
1− e−y
∫ y
0
eitx−xdx =
i
i+ t
ey − eity
ey − 1 , (37)
and
ϕY (t) = e
y
∫ ∞
y
eitx−xdx =
i
i+ t
eity. (38)
Hence, the conditional characteristic function of Ψ↓ is given by
ϕΨ↓|X↓k (t, y) =
(
i
i+ t
ey − eity
ey − 1
)N−k
= (1− it)k−N
(
ey − eity
ey − 1
)N−k
, (39)
the conditional characteristic function of Ψ↑ by
ϕΨ↑|X↓k (t, y) =
(
i
i+ t
eity
)k−1
= (1− it)1−k eity(k−1), (40)
and the conditional characteristic function of Ψ by
ϕΨ|X↓k (t, y) = e
ity (1− it)1−N
(
ey − eity
ey − 1
)N−k
eity(k−1) = (41)
= (1− it)1−N
(
ey − eity
ey − 1
)N−k
eityk. (42)
By the binomial theorem,(
ey − eity)N−k = ∑N−k
a=0
(
N − k
a
)
ey(N−k−a)ei(ty+pi)a, (43)
wherefore
ϕΨ↓|X↓k (t, y) = (e
y − 1)k−N
∑N−k
a=0
(
N − k
a
)
(1− it)k−N ey(N−k−a)eipiaeitya. (44)
Again by Levy’s inversion formula,
fΨ↓|X↓k (x, y) =
1
2pi
(ey − 1)k−N
∫ +∞
−∞
∑N−k
a=0
(
N − k
a
)
(1− it)k−N ey(N−k−a)eipiaeitya−itx dt = (45)
=
1
2pi
(ey − 1)k−N
∑N−k
a=0
(
N − k
a
)
ey(N−k−a)i2a
∫ +∞
−∞
(1− it)k−N eit(ya−x) dt = (46)
=
1
2pi
(ey − 1)k−N
∑N−k
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)
ey(N−k−a)F
{
(1− it)k−N
}
(x− ya) = (47)
=
1
2pi
(ey − 1)k−N
∑N
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
ey(N−a)F
{
(1− it)−(N−k)
}
(x− y(a− k)). (48)
Now by Bateman, 1954, § 3.2 (3), p. 118,
fΨ↓|X↓k (x, y) = (49)
=
(ey − 1)k−N
2pi
N∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
ey(N−a)
{
2pi(x−y(a−k))N−k−1e−(x−y(a−k))
Γ(N−k) : x > y(a− k)
0 : x ≤ y(a− k) = (50)
=
(1− e−y)k−N
(N − k − 1)! e
−x∑min(N,bx/yc+k)
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
(x− y(a− k))N−k−1 . (51)
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Likewise,
fΨ↑|X↓k (x, y) =
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(1− it)1−k eity(k−1)−itx dt = (52)
=
1
2pi
F
{
(1− it)1−k
}
(x− y(k − 1)) = (53)
=
1
(k − 2)!
{
(x− y(k − 1))k−2 ey(k−1)−x : x > y(k − 1)
0 : x ≤ y(k − 1) , (54)
and
fΨ↑+X↓k |X↓k (x, y) = fΨ↑|X↓k (x− y, y) =
1
(k − 2)!
{
(x− yk)k−2 eyk−x : x > yk
0 : x ≤ yk . (55)
A.3. Joint density and ratio. Joint density is easy to obtain from the above results:
fΨ↑+X↓k ,X
↓
k
(x, y) =
1
(k − 2)!
{
(x− yk)k−2 eyk−x : x > yk
0 : x ≤ yk × k
(
N
k
)
e−ky
(
1− e−y)N−k = (56)
= 1{x>yk}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)(
1− e−y)N−k (x− yk)k−2 e−x. (57)
And the density of the ratio P ↓k = X
↓
k/
(
X↓k + Ψ
↑
)
is given by
fP↓k
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
x1{x>zk}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)(
1− e−zx)N−k (x− zxk)k−2 e−x dx = (58)
= 1{z<1/k}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)
(1− zk)k−2
∫ ∞
0
xk−1e−x
(
1− e−zx)N−k dx = (59)
= 1{z<1/k}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)
(1− zk)k−2
∫ ∞
0
xk−1e−x
N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)
e−zxa dx = (60)
= 1{z<1/k}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)
(1− zk)k−2
N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)∫ ∞
0
xk−1e−zxa−x dx = (61)
= 1{z<1/k}
k
(k − 2)!
(
N
k
)
(1− zk)k−2
N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)
(1 + az)
−k
Γ (k) = (62)
= 1{z<1/k} k (k − 1)
(
N
k
)
(1− zk)k−2
N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)
(1 + az)
−k
. (63)
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Appendix B. Obtaining the probability of relevance
We are interested in Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
. By integrating the density of P ↓k , we obtain
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
=
∫ k−1
(2m+k)−1
fP↓k
(x) dx = (64)
= k (k − 1)
(
N
k
)N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)∫ k−1
(2m+k)−1
(1− xk)k−2
(1 + ax)
k
dx = (65)
= k (k − 1)
(
N
k
)N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
) −1
(k − 1) (a+ k)
(
1− xk
1 + ax
)k−1∣∣∣∣∣
x=k−1
x=(2m+k)−1
= (66)
= k (k − 1)
(
N
k
)N−k∑
a=0
(−1)a
(
N − k
a
)
1
(k − 1) (a+ k)
(
2m
a+ k + 2m
)k−1
= (67)
= k
(
N
k
) N∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
1
a
(
2m
a+ 2m
)k−1
. (68)
Likewise, we are interested in Pr
(
V ↓k > τ
)
. By integrating the density of V ↓k , we obtain
Pr
(
V ↓k > τ
)
=
∫ k−1
τ
fV ↓k
(x) dx = (69)
= N (N − 1)
(
N − 1
k − 1
)∫ k−1
τ
min(N,b1/xc)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
(1− ax)N−2 dx = (70)
= N (N − 1)
(
N − 1
k − 1
)min(N,bτ−1c)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)∫ a−1
τ
(1− ax)N−2 dx = (71)
= N (N − 1)
(
N − 1
k − 1
)min(N,bτ−1c)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
(1− aτ)N−1
a (N − 1) = (72)
= N
(
N − 1
k − 1
)min(N,bτ−1c)∑
a=k
(−1)a−k
(
N − k
a− k
)
1
a
(1− aτ)N−1 . (73)
Appendix C. Obtaining the moments of the distribution of the number of relevant
parties
First moment (expectation):
En =
N∑
k=1
kPr (n = k) =
N∑
k=1
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N−1∑
k=1
kPr
(
P ↓k+1 > tk+1
)
= (74)
=
N∑
k=1
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=2
(k − 1) Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
= (75)
=
N∑
k=1
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=2
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
+
N∑
k=2
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
=
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
. (76)
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Second moment:
E
(
n2
)
=
N∑
k=1
k2 Pr (n = k) =
N∑
k=1
k2 Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k2 Pr
(
P ↓k+1 > tk+1
)
= (77)
=
N∑
k=1
k2 Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=2
(k − 1)2 Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
= (78)
= Pr
(
P ↓1 > t1
)
−
N∑
k=2
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
+ 2
N∑
k=2
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
= (79)
= 2
N∑
k=2
kPr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
−
N∑
k=1
Pr
(
P ↓k > tk
)
. (80)
